The Interpretation of Husserl’s Time-Consciousness in the Reconstruction of the Concept of Anthropic Time. Part One = Інтерпретація гуссерлівського time-consciousness в реконструкції концепції антропного часу. Частина перша

The purpose of the article is to comprehend the Husserlian model of constituting temporal modes through the ability of intentional "retentional-protentional" consciousness, as well as to clarify the possibility of interpreting its positions in the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time. Theoretical basis. The theoretical framework of the research includes: 1) the interpretation of the phenomenological reflection of "time-consciousness" by E. Husserl in the context of solving the problem of phased-differentiation of this form of temporality; 2) the concept of anthropic time (V. Khanzhy). Originality. For the first time in research literature, the possibilities of applying the ideas of Husserl to the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time are considered through the interpretation of the phenomenological solution to the problem of temporality, proposed and specified in Husserl’s "time-consciousness" concept. Conclusions. The comprehension of the Husserlian model of intentionality of consciousness through the "grasping-from-now" and the constitution of phases of phenomenological time through the component of "exitingfrom-now" showed that solving the problem of phased-differentiation of phenomenological time leads to the observation of the impossibility of isolating the modes of past, present, and future as self-sufficient and unconditional. More accurate indications, based on the constitutive intentionality of consciousness on the "grasping-from-now" phases of time (as conventional), are as follows: a) the abilities of retention and recollection are the foundation for the constitution of the past and its connections to the present; b) the perception establishes the basis for the phase of the present itself; c) the possibilities of protention and anticipation (as forms of imagination) constitute the future and its connections to the present. By the concept of retention, Husserl fixes a certain primary memory (the present "now" of a past interval), which enables retaining the past in the present. The category of recollection or secondary memory is used by the philosopher to refer to the self-sufficient reproduction of past experiences (without being joined to present perception). The fundamental difference between recollection and retention is that the former represents a temporal interval, grasping its content and reproducing it as it was in the past, while in the latter, the perceived duration is presented as a fragment of time that has just passed. According to the German philosopher, the "grasping" of the present phase is performed by perception. Through the constitutive intentionality of consciousness, perception synthesizes the results of primary-actual activity and retentional holding of duration. The second part of the article will present solutions to the following research tasks: 1) analysis of the possibilities of protention and anticipation in constituting the future and its connections with the present; 2) understanding the possibility of using interpreted forms of Husser’s ideas in reconstructing the concept of anthropic time. Principles for a systems-theoretic study of consciousness: a logical-methodological analysis The article proposes a set of methodological principles necessary for constructing a coherent and comprehensive systemic account of consciousness. It is argued that existing approaches (neurobiological, computational, phenomenological, or cultural) cannot converge without a meta-theoretical framework capable of coordinating heterogeneous data and avoiding entrenched metaphysical assumptions. Drawing on general systems theory, three principles are formulated: structural-ontological neutrality, which abstracts away from essentialist ontological commitments; differentiation of perspectives, which distinguishes firstperson and third-person standpoints as well as the epistemic and ontic layers of these perspectives; and embodiment, which emphasizes the constraining and constitutive role of the substrate in a consciousness system. An analysis of modal counter-examples shows that the absence of any of these principles undermines the very conditions for a systemic science of consciousness. Taken together, these principles provide a methodological minimum for a metaphysically neutral framework for integrating theories, preventing category errors, and clarifying the structural conditions for the study of consciousness.